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Promoting substantive gender equality through 
the law on pregnancy discrimination, maternity 
and parental leave  
 
Dr Jule Mulder* 
 
Introduction 
 
EU sex discrimination law has long recognised the link between sex and pregnancy 
discrimination. It considers pregnancy discrimination under the scope of direct sex 
discrimination and recognises the need for special protection in relation to 
pregnancy/maternity. Article 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union recognises a general right to reconcile family and professional life. It also envisages 
protection while on maternity leave, a right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave 
in addition to the non-discrimination and gender equality provisions in Article 21 and 23. 
Paternity leave is not mentioned and the Article’s focus on maternity leave does not 
recognise other less detrimental ways that could enable families and mothers to reconcile 
family and work life.1 The Pregnancy Directive provides minimum special protections to 
pregnant women and women who have recently given birth.2 Additionally, EU law also 
provides minimum parental-leave rights available to both parents and the recently 
proposed Directive on the work-life balance aims to extend these rights and encourage 
fathers to take longer periods of leave.3 Member States often go beyond these minimum 
protections and provide further rights. Nevertheless, pregnancy discrimination continues 
to be one of the most common and well-reported forms of discrimination within Member 
States.4 Women who are pregnant or have recently given birth experience detrimental 
treatment, loss of opportunities and demotion.  
 
The causes for this are complex and multifaceted. Inter alia, gender expectations and 
stereotypes may motivate employers to consider pregnant women and women who have 
recently given birth as less attractive employees, as they are expected to prioritise 
childcare over work responsibilities and to be less flexible than other employees, once they 
return from their (often relatively short) maternity leave. Such gender expectations in 
relation to pregnancy and childcare disadvantage all women, even if they are not or will 
never be pregnant or give birth because they are either expected to become mothers or 
have the typical traits of a carer. This article argues that rights that exclusively focus on 
pregnancy and maternity fail to tackle these gender expectations and stereotypes. They 
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are thus unlikely to prevent pregnancy and maternity discrimination and struggle to 
advance gender equality. Accordingly, this article analyses how broader rights to parental 
leave can effectively support substantive gender equality and tackle pregnancy 
discrimination within the European legal framework. It does so by drawing on recent 
developments within the CJEU case law and two Member States, the UK and Germany, 
that signal a shift of paradigm by focusing more directly on fathers’ involvement in 
childcare and paternity leave. These laws potentially take a more holistic approach towards 
challenging gender expectations and fostering substantive gender equality. 
 
To explore how family-oriented provisions can support substantive gender equality, this 
article is structured in three parts. Firstly, it will discuss how the concept of substantive 
gender equality can help theorising pregnancy and maternity discrimination. It will then 
consider the EU legal framework and the CJEU approach towards sex discrimination in 
relation to pregnancy and rights associated with maternity leave and parental leave. 
Finally, it will discuss recent developments in the UK and Germany to illustrate the 
progressive potential and pitfalls of different leave provisions in the light of substantive 
gender equality and the EU legal framework. This article will conclude by identifying how 
the EU legal framework could support Member States’ leave provisions that tackle gender 
expectations in relation to pregnancy and maternity more effectively.  
Substantive gender equality 
 
The CJEU has repeatedly held that EU non-discrimination law aims at fostering substantive 
rather than formal gender equality.5 Substantive equality goes beyond procedural equal 
treatment and focuses on outcomes, equal opportunities, and structural or social inequality 
that places formally equal people in different situations within society and may hinder 
them to compete on an equal footing. Accordingly, it focuses on the effects of treatment 
and suggests a group-sensitive and asymmetrical approach.6 The multi-dimensional 
nature of the concept of equality means that its precise scope is difficult to ascertain. 
Fredman identifies four overlapping dimensions: the redistributive, the transformative, the 
participative, and the recognition dimension.7 Most important for the discussion below is 
that the redistribution dimension targets disadvantages of certain groups, whether 
material or structural. This may include positive actions but also the general removal of 
obstacles. The transformative dimension aims at abolishing structural disadvantages and 
providing accommodation of different needs.8  
 
Within the feminist critique, the ‘male norm’ has often been referred to as a standard that 
structurally disadvantages women within employment. While male and female workers are 
often confronted with the same set of expectations in terms of flexibility, availability and 
commitment, these expectations are not always gender-neutral but rather based on the 
traditional male gender role as breadwinner with a domestic support system that takes 
care of children and household. Men are often more able to comply with these expectations 
if traditional gender roles persist within society. Formal equality ignores that women will 
only have the right to equal treatment once they behave and organise their life like men, 
9 which is something that most women will struggle to do as long as they continue to carry 
the majority of domestic or childcare responsibilities. There is thus a need to link inequality 
and difference, by recognising diversity, dismissing the comparison approach, and 
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highlighting existing social, economic, and biological differences and structural 
inequality.10 
 
Women’s reproductive capacities and their medical needs before and after they give birth 
makes it extremely difficult for women to comply with the male standard as pregnancy 
will include absences and potential temporary incapacity to work. Women are thus in a 
different situation while pregnant. EU law has responded to this in several ways. It has 
banned pregnancy discrimination but also provided special rights to pregnant workers and 
those who have recently given birth. Finding the right balance has been a challenge, as 
laws recognising women’s biological reproductive difference have arguably turned them 
into less attractive employees and job applicants. Moreover, pregnancy can trigger socially 
constructed gender differences in addition to the biological and reproductive ones. After 
all, pregnancies do not produce disadvantages simply because of the relatively short period 
of time women will be absent from work, but also because it is often assumed or observed 
that women are more likely to carry the primary burden of childcare, to reduce their 
working time and to become less committed employees as they prioritise domestic and 
childcare responsibilities.11 Women’s common experiences of detrimental treatment once 
they return from maternity leave and the rather stubborn ‘motherhood penalty’ 
demonstrate that disadvantages often are not simply linked to maternity but to 
motherhood in more general terms.12 Protective measures can maintain, further, or 
establish such stereotypes about women and female gender roles that go beyond the 
medical needs before and after birth, especially if they encourage women to organise their 
life according to traditional gender roles. Once accepted, such stereotypes disadvantage 
all women as they all carry the same risk of motherhood and female gender roles, even if 
they are not and will never be pregnant. To separate the burdens of parenthood from 
pregnancy thus seems crucial for the fostering of substantive gender equality, as it tackles 
an influential gender stereotype that disadvantages women at the workplace.13 
 
A stereotype is ‘a generalized view or preconception of attributes or characteristics 
possessed by, or the roles that should be performed by, members of a particular group’.14 
It can be negative or positive albeit patronising.15 While stereotypes often impose certain 
behaviour upon people by indicating what they should do, how they should look, and what 
their role should be (prescriptive), stereotypes can also describe facts in a sense that there 
is often some statistical or empirical truth to them (descriptive).16 This means that there 
is a circular link between the different dimensions of the stereotype. The prescriptive 
nature of stereotypes may mean that there are social, cultural and economic pressures for 
women to accept most caring responsibilities. However, women also de facto take up more 
of these responsibilities and choose to do so despite the professional disadvantages 
associated with that choice. There is thus a descriptive basis for the motherhood 
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16 Timmer, A (2011), ‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights’ Human 
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Journal of Comparative Law vol 63, issue 1, 239-284; Peroni, L and Timmer, A (2016), ‘Gender Stereotyping in 
Domestic Violence Cases’ in: Brems, E and Timmer, A (eds.) Stereotypes and Human Rights Law, Cambridge, 
Intersentia, p. 39, 41. 
 
  
stereotype.17 Leave provisions can affect both aspects. They may encourage women to 
self-select into a less competitive environment, so they can prioritise childcare (supply) 
and employers may conceive them as less desirable employees (demand).18 While 
emancipation seems impossible without autonomy,19 the choices made need to be 
understood in this context. Women may choose to take long-term parental leave or to 
work part-time. However, they make these choices within a specific economic, cultural 
and social context of structural inequality. Disadvantages connected to these choices thus 
need to be tackled even if the women choose these circumstances.20 Similarly, fathers 
may have more freedom arranging their involvement with the children’s upbringing as 
they wish. However, they may also face additional social and economic pressures to forgo 
any rights available to them. Compulsory types of leave may counteract these social 
pressures that limit fathers’ and mothers’ choices, despite their potential paternalistic 
nature.21  
 
To foster substantive equality, law prohibiting sex discrimination and providing special 
rights to young parents thus need to be a multi-edged sword. It needs to protect women 
from discrimination based on pregnancy. It needs to provide accommodation to enable 
absences due to pregnancy and subsequent leave. It needs to provide further protection 
from disadvantages that are linked to choices made in the existing circumstances. Finally, 
it needs to challenge these circumstances and prevent re-enforcement of descriptive 
stereotypes. The challenge is to simultaneously tackle the prescriptive nature of some 
motherhood stereotypes, while also recognising the descriptive reality that disadvantages 
women within the labour market.  
 
EU legal framework 
 
The CJEU’s approach towards pregnancy discrimination often serves as an example to 
highlight the substantive value of EU non-discrimination law. Since only biological females 
can become pregnant,22 the CJEU held in Dekker that pregnancy discrimination constitutes 
direct sex discrimination.23 Women shall thus not be disadvantaged because of their 
pregnancy, even if there is no comparator and they are in a different situation than men 
and women who are not or will never be pregnant. The Court thus recognises the link 
between pregnancy and the biological female sex, although it has not taken its finding to 
its logical conclusion, as it has excluded women who suffer pregnancy-related illnesses 
after maternity leave from the protection although only biological females can have 
pregnancy-related illnesses prior or post pregnancy.24 Nevertheless, the Court has 
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generally rejected detrimental treatment that is based on the worker’s pregnancy and 
viewed comparisons with men who were ill with scepticism.25  
 
Today, Article 2(2)(c) Recast Directive also prohibits less favourable treatment of women 
in relation to pregnancy and maternity, and Article 15 Recast Directive protects women’s 
right to return to their job or an equivalent post at the end of their maternity leave.26 
Article 16 provides similar protection to those who are entitled to paternity or adoption 
leave. Additionally, the Pregnancy Directive provides protections and entitlements for 
pregnant workers and those that have recently given birth. Most notably, women are 
entitled to at least 14 weeks of maternity leave, two of which are compulsory (Article 8); 
women are protected from dismissal during pregnancy leave and maternity leave, save 
exceptional circumstances (Article 10);27 and women are entitled to a payment during the 
leave (Article 11) that is at least comparable to statutory sickness payments.28 
Additionally, the Parental Leave Directive provides minimum rights of leave to fathers and 
mothers with at least one month of leave being provided on a non-transferable basis. 
Clause 2(2) explicitly aims to encourage a more equal take-up of the leave by both 
parents. The Commission’s proposal on work-life balance for parents and carers suggests 
implementing measures that further encourage fathers to take up leave. The proposal 
inter alia suggests a right to ten days of paternity leave (Article 4), a right to individual 
non-transferable parental leave of four months that can be taken on a flexible (e.g. part-
time) basis (Article 5), and a right to adequate payment for the duration of the leave 
(Article 8).  
 
EU law thus takes a tri-layered approach. It prohibits pregnancy discrimination, it provides 
special protection in relation to pregnancy and maternity, and it provides leave for both 
parents. Unfortunately, it seems that the special rights often overshadow the equal access 
approach. The CJEU consistently justifies the right to maternity leave with reference to the 
women’s biological condition and their special relationship with the child.29 While there 
may be a special relationship linked with women’s biological conditions in relation to 
breastfeeding, such general statement reinforces stereotypes as it prioritises women’s 
caring responsibility and draws a direct distinction between her role as mother and the 
father’s role.30 Moreover, while the CJEU subsumes pregnancy under sex discrimination, 
it has often refused to challenge the traditional division of labour.31 Despite focusing on 
disadvantages, EU case law on pregnancy thus often comes across as special protection 
provided to women in a fragile state. Protection that can be withdrawn once she returns 
to work.32  
 
It has been suggested that recent case law, in addition to changed policy aims, is more 
sensitive to gender stereotypes and rejects the traditional division of labour as a 
                                                          
25 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-32/93, Webb v EMO Air Cargo, 14 July 1994. 
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28 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities 
Commission, 27 October 1998.  
29 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 184/83, Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, 12 July 1984, 
paragraph 25; C-116/06, Sari Kiiski v Tampereen kaupunki, 20 September 2007, paragraph 46; C-5/12, Marc 
Betriu Montull v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, 19 September 2013, paragraph 50. 
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Review, issue 1, pp. 37, 40; McGlynn, C., ‘Work, Family, and Parenthood’ in: Conaghan, J. and Rittich, K. 
(eds.), Labour Law, Work, and Family, Oxford, OUP, pp. 217-236. 
31 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 170/84, Bilka v Weber von Hartz, 13 May 1986, paragraph 
43. 
32 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-191/03, North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna, 
8 September 2005.  
 
  
justification for excluding fathers from certain benefits in relation to childcare.33 Roca 
Álvarez can serve as an example of this development. The CJEU held that the so-called 
breastfeeding leave was sufficiently separated from the women’s biological ability to 
breastfeed and primarily focused on childcare. Since fathers and mothers are equally able 
to take care of their children, they had to have equal access to the leave. The scheme was 
discriminatory because fathers had no independent right to the leave but depended on a 
maternal transfer. Explicitly, the CJEU recognised that the exclusion of men from the leave 
may perpetuate traditional gender roles.34 Just as in the decision in Griesmar,35 the Court 
drew a distinction between special protections related to the women’s biological state 
(including disadvantages linked to maternity leave) and measures that are designed to 
protect women in their role as parents. Since fathers are parents too, the latter constitutes 
sex discrimination. The reasoning has been confirmed in subsequent case law.36  
 
Equal access to parental leave can challenge gender stereotypes as it encourages fathers 
to take up equal parental responsibilities and thus separates the risks related to 
parenthood from the female sex.37 However, the approach also bears some dangers. 
Firstly, the anti-stereotyping approach shows limited awareness of the de facto situation 
of women, as it partly remains within the logic of formal equality. Predominantly, it 
challenges distinctions between men and women based on stereotypical assumptions 
regarding their living arrangements. In the same vein, the CJEU has challenged limited 
access to survivor pensions for men unless their wives were the main breadwinner,38 looser 
age requirements to enter the civil service for unmarried widows,39 and flexible retirement 
schemes for women whose husbands have become disabled.40 However, it does not 
consider the potential descriptive truth within the stereotype and the pressures that create 
it.41 Thus, it opens access to these benefits to men who are, at least statistically, likely to 
be in a much better position than women and thus benefits them further. This may not be 
too problematic as long as it does not mean a reduction of rights for women. However, in 
the long run, there is a risk that their entitlements are reduced or means-tested. In that 
light, it may not be too surprising that some women’s groups in the UK rejected legal 
proposals to allow fathers equal access to shared parental leave.42 The argument would 
be that mothers carry out most of the childcare responsibilities, whether fathers have 
access to leave or not. A reduction of their rights to leave for the benefit of the father thus 
potentially leaves women worse off, as they lose their hard-won rights and face difficulties 
to remain employed. The CJEU’s assessment of motherhood via surrogacy arrangements 
demonstrates this conundrum. Formally, the Court is correct to consider the comparability 
                                                          
33 Caracciolo di Torella, E. (2014), ‘Brave New Fathers for a Brave New World? Fathers as Caregivers in an 
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34 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-104/09, Pedro Manuel Roca Álvarez v Sesa Start España 
ETT SA, 30 September 2010, paragraph 36. 
35 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-266/99, Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de l'Économie, des 
Finances et de l'Industrie, 29 November 2001, paragraph 44. Masselot, A. (2001), ‘Pregnancy, maternity and 
the organisation of family life: an attempt to classify the case law of the Court of Justice’ European Law 
Review, vol. 26, issue 3, pp. 239, 245. 
36 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-222/14, Konstantinos Maïstrellis v Ypourgos Dikaiosynis, 16 
July 2015. 
37 Timmer, A (2016), ‘Gender Stereotyping in the Case Law of the EU Court of Justice’ European Equality Law 
Review, issue1, pp. 37-46. 
38 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C- 379/99, Barmer Ersatzkasse v Hans Menauer, 9 October 
2001. 
39 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-319/03, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l'Intérieur, 30 
September 2004. 
40 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-206/00, Henri Mouflin v Recteur de l'académie de Reims, 
13 December 2001. 
41 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-220/02, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, 8 June 2004, where the court dismissed comparability of absence due to 
military service and parental leave and held that the former constituted a civic obligation while the latter was a 
voluntary act. It therefore did not matter that almost only women took parental leave. 
42 Baird, M and O’Brien, M (2015), ‘Dynamics of parental leave in Anglophone countries’ Community, Work & 
Family, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 198, 210-211.  
 
  
of fathers and mothers who become parents via a surrogacy arrangement. After all, neither 
give birth to the child.43 However, the absence of any paid leave entitlements is likely to 
affect mothers more severely than fathers. Rights to maternity leave can help women to 
stay in employment and thus advance gender equality. If fathers are less likely to take 
leave, it is not an accident that the above-discussed cases, in which the fathers seek access 
to leave, all deal with situations in which, due to the mother’s lack of employment, the 
leave would have been lost without an independent right to leave for the father. It does 
not necessarily follow that the fathers picked up the role as primary carer for the duration 
of that leave. Not granting the leave to fathers at all may mean however that they are 
never able to take up that role, which will also disadvantage their female partners.44 
 
Secondly, the distinction between maternity leave and parental leave is not always clear. 
In Sass, the CJEU held that a leave must be categorised based on its purpose, not its 
length. If it aims at protecting ‘the woman’s biological condition and the special 
relationship between the woman and her child’, it constitutes maternity leave and cannot 
result in less favourable treatment.45 Following these guidelines, the German Federal 
Labour Court held that the 20 weeks of leave available in the former German Democratic 
Republic (Eastern Germany) did not constitute maternity leave because it was not granted 
to all birth mothers, but only if the child lived with the mother. It thus aimed at general 
childcare.46 Sass’ leave was thus retroactively reclassified as parental leave, which affected 
her seniority and consequently her pay.47 However, in Betriu Montull the CJEU did consider 
a leave to fall within the notion of maternity leave because it fell within the 14-week period 
guaranteed by the Pregnancy Directive.48 It did not matter that some of the leave was 
transferable to the father if both parents were employed and thus predominantly focused 
on childcare rather than the woman’s biological condition or special relationship. Such 
uncertainty within the approach leaves great flexibility to the Member States regarding 
the available leaves and allows for the continued existence of leave provisions and 
measures that are based on stereotypical assumptions about mothers, fathers and gender 
roles.  
 
National leave provisions encouraging fathers to care 
 
The national approaches to leave have been the focus of much political and academic 
debate. Member States’ approaches range from welfare systems that are based on the 
traditional breadwinner/housemaker distinction, to systems that aim at changing gender 
relations and actively encourage mothers to return to work.49 This article is not the place 
to discuss these different approaches in detail. Instead, it will focus on two recent 
developments in the UK and Germany to illustrate the progressive potential and pitfalls of 
different leave provisions in the light of substantive gender equality and the EU legal 
framework.  
 
                                                          
43 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-167/12, C. D. v S. T., 18 March 2014. 
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10, issue 4, pp. 442, 452. 
45 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-284/02 Land Brandenburg v Ursula Sass, 18 November 
2004, paragraphs 34-39; C-294/04, Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto Madrileño de la Salud, 16 February 
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46 Germany, Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), 6 AZR 108/01-B, 16 June 2005, paragraphs 20-24. 
47 Mulder, J. (2017) EU Non-Discrimination Law in the Courts, Oxford, Hart Publishing, pp. 183-185. 
48 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), C-5/12, Marc Betriu Montull v Instituto Nacional de la 
Seguridad Social, 19 September 2013. 
49 Moss, P. and Deven, F. (eds.) (2015) ‘Leave policies in challenging times (special issue)’ Community, Work & 
Family, vol. 18, no. 2; Kamerman, S. and Moss, P. (eds.) (2009), The Politics of Parental Leave Policies: 
Children, Parenting, Gender and the Labour Market, Bristol, Policy Press. 
 
  
The UK Shared Parental Leave  
 
Section 17-18 of the UK Equality Act 2010 explicitly prohibits unfavourable treatment 
because of pregnancy without requiring a comparator and the maternity leave is generous 
compared to the EU minimum requirements, after it was extended to 12 months in 2003. 
Additionally, paternity leave (2 weeks), shared parental leave and parental leave 
provisions potentially enable fathers to be directly involved in the early upbringing of their 
children.50 However, none of these types of leave are compulsory. This means that fathers 
have great flexibility regarding the way they organise their childcare involvement. The 
shared parental leave provisions introduced in 2015 allow parents to share 50 of the 52 
weeks of maternity leave between them, depending on their choice.51 In principle, it thus 
enables some flexibility between parents and long and slow-term involvement of fathers.52 
Fathers are therefore able to take up responsibilities related to everyday childcare that is 
long-term and slow instead of only being able to reserve some free time to ensure quality 
time with their children (e.g. during the weekend). However, fathers are not equally 
entitled to the leave. Rather, the shared parental leave, as well as its predecessor the 
2010 additional parental leave, are based on maternal transfer.53 Fathers’ leave therefore 
depends on the mother’s discretion and her formal entitlement.54 Moreover, statutory pay 
is very low during the first 39 weeks of leave (£145.18 a week or 90% of your average 
weekly earnings). While statutory maternity pay is also low, the first six weeks are paid at 
a rate of 90 % of whatever is earned. The last 13 weeks are unpaid.55 Employers may 
choose to top-up the statutory pay. However, according to the guidelines published by the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills (the ‘BIS guidelines’), the pay during shared 
parental leave ‘may or may not be the same as the employer offers mothers on maternity 
leave’.56 As opposed to maternity leave, the shared parental leave is also not a day-one 
right but requires 26 weeks of employment with the same employer by the fifteenth week 
before the expected day of birth.57  
 
Despite the positive recognition of fathers’ role in children’s upbringing and the need for 
equal parenting to tackle sex discrimination and the gender pay gap in the legislative 
process, the estimated uptake was small.58 De facto, only 1 % of new parents took 
advantage of the scheme between 2015 and 2017.59 The scheme therefore has limited 
impact on the traditional division of labour within families. The reasons for this are easily 
identifiable. Leaves based on maternal transferal are badly equipped to encourage fathers 
to take long-term leave, as the primary childcare responsibility remains with the mother.60 
Fathers have great flexibility. Consequently, they often view taking leave as their choice 
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rather than their parental obligation.61 Flexibility can also impose additional external 
pressures not to take leave as it is not considered the norm.62 Fathers whose partners are 
not eligible for maternity leave are altogether excluded from the scheme and the eligibility 
requirement of 26 weeks of employment distinguishes the leave from the day-one right to 
maternity leave. The scheme thus risks legitimising discrimination of women of 
childbearing age.63 The low statutory pay can serve as a further obstacle. While most of 
the maternity pay is at the same low rate, the gender pay gap makes it more likely for 
families to depend on the father’s income. This may dissuade fathers.64 Apart from the 2-
week paternity leave, none of the leaves available to fathers are provided on a ‘use-it-or-
lose-it’ basis and the paternity leave is not compulsory. The leave provisions thus fail to 
incentivise fathers to take long-term leave and do not create any legal expectations. 
 
From a European perspective, the leaves also conflate maternity leave and parental leave. 
They do not sufficiently distinguish between the mother’s biological condition after birth 
and the fathers’ and mothers’ role as parents. The UK shared parental leave would be 
contrary to EU law if it were deemed to constitute parental leave, since fathers and 
mothers do not have equal access to the leave. To prevent this, it has to fall under the 
scope of the Pregnancy Directive. While CJEU case law has not been entirely consistent on 
this point, the classification of the leave depends on the purpose not the name of the 
leave. It is highly questionable whether a full-year leave can be justified by the mother’s 
biological condition after birth or the special relationship with the child. The transferable 
nature of the leave further suggests that it is primarily concerned with childcare. While 
similar arguments were not accepted in Betriu Montull, the case was concerned with 
timeframes that fell within the minimum requirements set out by the Pregnancy Directive 
while the full-year shared parental leave exceeds that timeframe.  
 
The comparability between maternity leave and shared parental leave has also been the 
subject of recent case law. The question was whether a difference in pay as accepted by 
Paragraph 77 of the BIS guidelines constituted direct or indirect sex discrimination. While 
the Employment Tribunal (ET) confirmed this,65 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) in 
Capita Customer Management v Ali distinguished between the different purposes of 
maternity leave and shared parental leave.66 According to the EAT, the correct comparator 
of a father on shared parental leave is a mother on shared parental leave, as this leave 
focuses on childcare alone. It thus upheld a provision that provided 14 weeks of full pay 
to mothers on maternity leave but only 2 weeks of full pay to fathers on paternity leave. 
It could do so with reference to Betriu Montull, because the pay fell within the 14 weeks 
of maternity leave provided for by the Pregnancy Directive. The ET has also accepted 
differences between maternity pay and additional paternity leave pay (the predecessor of 
shared parental leave pay). While the tribunal identified potential indirect discrimination, 
it considered it justified, if the employer could show that the policy was aimed at recruiting 
and retaining women.67 This means that the introduction of the various types of leave has 
not led to a different assessment of the maternity leave taken in the weeks after the birth. 
This seems to be in line with current EU law. However, it is questionable whether the EAT’s 
assessment could be upheld regarding leave later in the period. The longer the leave, the 
more difficult it seems to argue that its purpose focuses on the woman’s biological 
condition. Capita Customer Management also demonstrates that it is not always in the 
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medical interest of young mothers to have long leave periods after their birth. In that case, 
the mother was encouraged to return to work early to assist her recovery from post-natal 
depression.  
 
The German Parental Leave (Elternzeit) 
 
German Law on parental leave changed significantly in 2007. Traditionally, the Western 
welfare system based its entitlements on the breadwinner model and encouraged mothers 
to stay at home for three years after the child’s birth. However, the new parental-leave 
provisions aim at reducing the opportunity costs associated with leave and at enabling 
mothers to return to work within or after the first year of leave.68 Inter alia, it was hoped 
that the new scheme aimed at employment and gender equality would increase the birth 
rate.69 The current system distinguishes between maternity leave and parental leave. 
Pregnant women may not be engaged by their employer to do work for six weeks before 
the due date unless they explicitly consent, and they are on a compulsory leave of 8 weeks 
after they give birth. During that time, they receive EUR 13 in maternity pay per day from 
their health insurance and an employer supplement that covers the gap between the 
maternity pay and the net regular pay.70 Additionally, both parents have access to parental 
leave. The parental-leave provisions introduced several innovations regarding pay. Firstly, 
rather than a low monthly flat-rate benefit with an income ceiling for the first 6 months, 
parents on leave receive 67 % of their previous income; with an absolute minimum of EUR 
300 and a cap at EUR 1,800 per month.71 Secondly, the pay is available for 12 months 
minus the received maternity pay. This is a reduction of time compared to the previous 24 
months of pay at a flat rate. However, parents can spread the pay over 24 months and 
will then receive 33.5 % of their pay.72 Finally, the new provisions provide for two ‘father 
months’ that are allocated at a ‘take it or lose it’ basis. If fathers take at least two months 
of leave the overall pay period is extended to 14 months.73 Unpaid leave can be taken 
subsequently.74 Parents can also work part-time during their leave. That income will be 
taken into account in the calculation of the parental-leave pay. 
 
The number of fathers taking leave has increased every year since the introduction of the 
new parental-leave provisions. For example, in 2014, 34 % of fathers took some parental 
leave including part-time leave. However, only 21 % of these fathers took more than the 
2 additional ‘father months’ and mothers continue to dedicate more of their time to 
childcare.75 Nevertheless, there is some evidence that fathers reduce their working time 
after the paid leave.76 The income-dependent pay during leave is less interesting for those 
parents whose overall income is low and unequally distributed. Thus, if the father’s income 
is significantly higher than the mother’s income but not high enough to be sufficient at a 
rate of 67%, fathers will be unable to take the leave and have to forgo the two ‘father 
months’. This has been the subject of a Constitutional complaint that challenged the 
alleged unfavourable treatment of low-income families. While the Federal Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that the provisions interfere with the free choice of parents to 
organise their family life (Article 6 German Constitution), it considered this interference 
justified as it aligned with the State’s duty to ‘promote the actual implementation of equal 
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rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages’ (Article 3(2) German 
Constitution) and was also proportionate.77 
 
Overall, leave provisions in German law are more in line with the system envisioned by EU 
law than the UK law on leave. A relatively short maternity leave (8 weeks after birth) 
reserved for the mother is supplemented with longer parental leave that is available to 
fathers and mothers. However, only the recent changes regarding pay have encouraged 
fathers to take up leave and most fathers only take the two months reserved for them. In 
comparison, the newly introduced UK shared parental leave scheme offers some pay to 
fathers but at a much lower rate and has not significantly increased the number of fathers 
who take leave. This suggests that a meaningful reduction of opportunity costs significantly 
reduces the pressure for fathers to stay in employment because they can afford to go on 
leave. At the same time, the German law increases the opportunity cost of not taking the 
two ‘father months’ because the leave then only includes 12 months, which results in an 
earlier need for external childcare or unpaid care by the mother. The German law regarding 
part-time parental leave is more ambiguous. The possibility to take 24 months of leave is 
clearly contrary to the aim of the legislation as it does not necessarily encourage mothers 
to return early to the labour market because the part-time leave can be taken without 
being in part-time employment.78 This means that it fails to address the costs associated 
with long-term leave and is not likely to reduce the motherhood penalty. However, the 
flexibility to take part-time leave as envisaged by Article 5(6) of the Commission's proposal 
on work-life balance may also have its benefits. Namely, it enables parents to stay 
connected with their employment and receive part-time pay. It thus reduced the financial 
sacrifice associated with long-time leave and enables parents to advance their career while 
on leave. However, research suggests that fathers having flexibility regarding their leave 
arrangements often choose leaves that allow them to have quality time with their children 
(e.g. one day of leave per week), rather than opting for ‘slow-time leave’ that deals with 
everyday childcare.79 The part-time leave provides fathers with this opportunity and thus 
entails the risk that mothers remain the primary carer unless they also work part-time. 
However, this is much less likely, given that gender roles as well as the full-time maternity 
leave gears mothers towards providing full-time care. 
Conclusion 
 
This article has evaluated recent developments in the EU legal framework and recent leave 
provisions introduced in two Member States, the UK and Germany, in the light of 
substantive gender equality. To ensure substantive gender equality in the context of 
pregnancy and maternity, women’s biological condition related to pregnancy and birth and 
the parents’ childcare responsibilities need to be acknowledged. Currently, both theses 
aspects burden women in the employment market. Women are more likely to accept these 
responsibilities beyond maternity and birth and are assumed to take them even if they do 
not have and will never have children. To challenge these prescriptive stereotypes while 
simultaneously acknowledging their descriptive reality, EU law needs to distinguish 
carefully between maternity leave and parental leave and ensure that the latter is de facto 
equally accessible to fathers and mothers. It is submitted that this means that long-term 
maternity leave that focuses on childcare should not be accepted. There is therefore a 
need to develop and apply stringent criteria to identify national leave provisions as either 
maternity leave or parental leave, irrespectively of their name. Transferability of the leave 
to the father should be a clear indicator regarding its focus on childcare, even if it falls 
within the timeframe provided by the Pregnancy Directive. Needs related to the biological 
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condition after birth differ, and protection in the context of long-term pregnancy-related 
illnesses may be more effectively addressed by a consistent application of the prohibition 
against pregnancy discrimination within the scope of direct sex discrimination. Pregnancy 
does not always require long post-natal leave and in some cases may even be harmful to 
the woman’s physical or mental health.  
 
Moreover, rules on parental leave need to do more than pay lip service regarding their 
equal access. While they may encourage fathers to take the leave that is reserved for 
them, there is clear evidence that the opportunity costs of taking leave primarily relate to 
pay, not to the availability of the leave itself. Where fathers’ income is higher than the 
mothers’, it can be too costly for the household to take up fathers’ leave regardless of its 
availability. The Commission’s proposal to guarantee an adequate income during parental 
leave (Article 8) takes a step in the right direction. However, given the persistence of the 
gender-pay gap, parental leave pay will have to make a meaningful contribution to the 
household income to enable fathers to take leave. In the same vein, a non-transferable 
leave will only encourage fathers to take it where it is adequately remunerated, so that 
not taking the fathers’ leave represents a larger loss of benefit than the cost for the mother 
to take unpaid leave for an equivalent period. This is particularly important in households 
with lower combined incomes, or for households where there is a large difference in the 
earnings of both parents. The proposed flexible part-time parental leave (Article 5) 
addresses some of the financial concerns (mainly, a similar difficulty linked to low pay 
during leave) and also has the benefit that it keeps mothers and fathers connected to their 
employment. However, in view of the author it may not effectively challenge gender roles 
because it enables fathers to take short-term part-time leave focused on quality time with 
their children rather than sharing the burden of everyday childcare. While mothers are 
enabled to take up part-time leave too, persisting gender roles makes it less likely that 
they will take up such opportunities.  
 
There are two components that deserve further consideration. The usefulness of 
compulsory (paternity) leaves for fathers in reducing flexibilities that make it unlikely for 
fathers to take up long-term leave focus on everyday childcare (either because of lack of 
interest or social pressures) and on the financial support needed to accommodate such 
leave. Both would ‘level up’80 the fathers’ role as parents and the associated leave. Beyond 
that, there are many other measures that can enable families and mothers to reconcile 
paid work and unpaid family obligations without creating the same disadvantages than are 
associated with long-term leave. This include measures that effectively regulate working 
time or provide affordable childcare.  
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